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Abstract
In this paper, we cast the classic problem of achieving k-anonymity for a given database as
a problem in algebraic topology. Using techniques from this field of mathematics, we propose a
framework for k-anonymity that brings new insights and algorithms to anonymize a database.
We begin by addressing the simpler case when the data lies in a metric space. This case is
instrumental to introduce the main ideas and notation. Specifically, by mapping a database
to the Euclidean space and by considering the distance between datapoints, we introduce a
simplicial representation of the data and show how concepts from algebraic topology, such
as the nerve complex and persistent homology, can be applied to efficiently obtain the entire
spectrum of k-anonymity of the database for various values of k and levels of generalization.
For this representation, we provide an analytic characterization of conditions under which a
given representation of the dataset is k-anonymous. We introduce a weighted barcode diagram
which, in this context, becomes a computational tool to tradeoff data anonymity with data loss
expressed as level of generalization. Some simulations results are used to illustrate the main
idea of the paper. We conclude the paper with a discussion on how to extend this method to
address the general case of a mix of categorical and metric data.
1 Introduction
Recent times have seen a revolution in computing technologies. Third-party computing services,
such as the Cloud, have been creating new paradigms for both, data storage and computation. Such
technologies require one to repeatedly revisit the basic question of “How do we protect the data
from a privacy perspective?”. Although this problem originated in database theory and computer
science applications, it has recently expanded to domains such as systems and control. In control
systems, there is always an information flow between sensors/actuators and controllers/plants and
even between controllers in the case of distributed or cloud-based control. In critical cyber-physical
systems such as power or transportation networks, where information about users and utility com-
panies are exchanged or information about multiple users is fused, privacy has become a critical
element to be considered [1]. Clearly, as the world is becoming more connected and loops are in-
creasingly being closed over millions of sensors [2], privacy is becoming a top priority in the control
community.
In this paper, we consider static data collected within a database that, in the context of cyber-
physical systems, could represent log/monitoring data that needs to be analyzed offline to determine
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overall system performance, enterprise level fault detection and propagation, forensic analysis, etc.
Although several approaches have been proposed to address different aspects of the privatization
of data within a database, this paper provides a novel framework and perspective to address the
most classical version of the problem using concepts and tools from algebraic topology.
1.1 Literature
Among several methods that have been developed for database privacy, a classic and popular
approach is k-anonymity, which is a mechanism for protecting privacy of individuals represented
as entries in a database [3]. The idea consists of removing all attributes from a database that
can be used as unique identifiers but retain a set of attributes, called quasi-identifiers, for which
identification may be possible but these are necessary for analysis. To such quasi-identifiers – ZIP
code, date of birth, GPS location, energy usage, data/time, etc. – one applies a transformation
that generalizes their value so that data records become indistinguishable. More precisely, for a
given value of k, the original database is modified so that at least kindividuals in the database
have identical quasi-identifiers. This is achieved by generalizing numeric or text attributes: for
example, the ZIP code can be generalized so that a certain number of the least significant digits are
suppressed as 46532→ 465∗∗, age could be generalized to intervals, 35→ [30, 40], and the gender
could be generalized as {M,F} → Person.
The problem of computing an optimal k-anonymous version of a database has been shown to
be NP-hard [4]. However, efficient algorithms such as Incognito [5] and its variants or greedy
clustering-based algorithms [6] have been proposed to achieve k-anonymity. A multi-dimensional
extension of the greedy approaches has been addressed in [7], which results into a representation of
the database that is reminiscent of classic grid-based paintings by Mondrian. In multi-dimensional
settings, a data aggregation scheme based on Hilbert curves has been proposed in [8].
Algebraic topology is a branch of mathematics that leverages tools and concepts from abstract
algebra to study topological spaces. For example, a simple model for sensor network is a set of
points in a (multidimensional) space in which two points (or sensors) are neighbours if they are
within a specified distance of each other. Then, concepts from algebraic topology, such as homology,
have been used to detect holes in sensor networks [9, 10]. Distributed algorithms to localize holes
in sensor networks using related concepts have been addressed in [11] and in [12]. Recently such
methods have been also used for filtering and position estimation in [13, 14].
One concept of privacy which has been applied to several control problems is that of differential
privacy [15]. Informally, this concept means that for a given database, if any single individual is
removed from the database, then no output of a computation run on the database would become
significantly more or less likely. This concept has been applied to achieve differential privacy of
Kalman filtering and estimation problems [16], to ensure a level of truthfulness in electric vehicle
charging applications [17], to achieve average consensus in a private manner [18], to name a few.
While the concept of differential privacy is very general and is applicable to dynamic databases, the
resulting mechanism relies very strongly on the type of function/query that needs to be computed
on the database. In contrast, k-anonymity is a static concept but is independent of any computation
to be carried out on the database and therefore suitable in the context of offline analysis. That said,
there are situations when k-anonymity is not sufficient and individuals can be re-identified despite
anonymization. Approaches to deal with such cases have been considered such as `-diversity [19]
and t-closeness [20]. Even though such advanced concepts have been proposed and privacy metrics
continue to be an active research area, k-anonymity is still widely used.
Extensions of the proposed approach to other metrics will be a subject of future study.
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1.2 Contributions
This paper introduces a novel perspective to data privacy based on algebraic topology. In particular,
we address the case when the data lies in a metric space. By defining two datapoints that lie within
a specified radius as neighbours, we show that the representation falls within the natural setting
of a Cˇech (or in general, a Nerve) complex [21]. By increasing the radius (generalization), we
show that the sequence of Cˇech complexes result into a filtration, i.e. nested complexes. This
further implies that tools such as persistent homology can be applied to efficiently obtain the entire
spectrum of k-anonymity of the database for various values of the generalization. The benefit of this
approach is that once the family of complexes is built, for various generalization values, we can apply
fast and scalable persistent homology algorithms, such as Perseus [22] to determine the tradeoffs.
Furthermore, the persistent diagram not only provides the tradeoffs between a generalization and
the value of k, but also show how many equivalent classes are formed for a given generalization
achieving a certain k-anonymity, a metric that has an impact on the anonymized data quality [23].
For this representation, we provide an analytic characterization of conditions under which a
given representation of the dataset is k-anonymous. Finally, we discuss how this method can be
extended to address the general case of a mix of categorical and metric data.
1.3 Organization of this paper
This paper is organized as follows. The problem formulation is presented in Section 2. Background
results and concepts from algebraic topology are reviewed in Section 3. The proposed approach
is presented in Section 4 for numerical data along with some simulation results. Extension of the
method described in Section 4 to mixed categorical and numerical data is discussed in Section 5.
2 Problem formulation
Let us consider a database table T (A1, A2, . . . , Am) consisting of N rows, where each Ai ∈ D are
various attributes that in general can take the form of numeric and/or categorical values, i.e., the
domain D can either be a set of discrete or continuous values. Without loss of generality, we can
identify with QT = {A1, A2, . . . , Ad} a set of d attributes that we define as quasi-identifiers, namely
attributes that can be joined with external information/databases so that private information can
be obtained. Typical examples of private data that could be obtained are names of individuals,
salaries, etc.
Another database table T¯ (A¯1, A¯2, . . . , A¯m) consisting of N rows is said to be a generalization
T¯ = G(T ) of the table T if, for every row Tj of T ,
QTj ⊂ QT¯j .
In this paper, as said previously, we will be focusing on the concept of k-anonymity for privacy,
that is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (k-anonymity [3]) Consider a generalized database T¯ and a quasi-identifier set QT¯ .
The set QT¯ is said to have the k-anonymity property if and only if each unique tuple in the projection
of T¯ on QT¯ occurs at least k times in T¯ .
Given a database T , the problem of k-anonymity is thus to determine a generalization func-
tion G(.) so that the resulting database T¯ = G(T ) is k-anonymous. Clearly, one may simply
generalize every entry and find the smallest set that generalizes every row of T . However, this
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trivial method would completely destroy the information content in the original database. The
problem is how to minimize such as over-generalization of the quasi-identifiers. This notion will be
made precise in Section 4.
3 Background on Topological Methods
In this section, we provide a summary of some useful concepts from algebraic topology that will be
used in our approach. Interested readers may refer to [21] and [24] for additional details on these
concepts.
Definition 3.1 (Cˇech complex) Given a collection of points {xi} ∈ Rn, the Cˇech complex is the
abstract simplicial complex whose k-simplices are determined by unordered (k+ 1)−tuples of points
{xi}k0 whose closed -ball neighborhoods have a point of common intersection.
3.1 Simplicial Homology
Homology is an algebraic characterization of “holes” in a topological space. The central notion
is that of a boundary homomorphism, which in the context of simplicial complexes, encodes how
simplices are attached to their lower dimensional facets. To define (simplicial) homology, of a
complex C, we choose an ordering of each simplex, in the same way directed graphs are ordered.
Given such ordering we consider R-vector spaces Ck(C) with basis the oriented k-simplices. We
thus have that C•, forms a sequence of vector spaces, which we call chain complex. A boundary
homomorphism is defined as the linear map ∂k : Ck(C)→ Ck−1(C) given by associating each basis
element of Ck(C) to the formal sum of its (oriented) faces of dimension k − 1. The boundary
operator ∂ = {∂k} thus encodes the assembly instructions of C. It turns out that the kth homology
group of the complex C, Hk(C) is given by
Hk(C) = Zk/Bk = ker ∂k/im ∂k+1 .
The group Zk = ker∂k is called the k-th cycle group and its elements (chains) represent k-cycles. We
have that Bk = im∂k+1 is the k-th boundary group whose elements are k-boundaries. The quotient
space Hk(C) thus represents all the k-cycles that are not boundaries of k+1 simplices, namely cycles
that represent k-dimensional “holes”. The homology of the complex C is then H•(C) = {Hk(C)}.
In this paper, we will use the notion of dimension of the k-th homology, that is the dimension
of the vector space Hk(C), dimHk(C). In particular, the k-th homology group Hk(C) is said to be
trivial if dimHk(C) = 0.
3.2 Persistent Homology
Let us consider a sequence of complexes C with  = {1, 2, . . . , M}, more specifically the sequence
of Cˇech complexes {Ci}Ni=1, for increasing i ∈ R≥0, i ≤ j for i 6= j. There are clearly inclusion
maps between such complexes
C1
ı
↪→ C2 ı↪→ · · · ı↪→ CM−1 ı↪→ CM .
Rather than studying the homology of each complex for each value of the parameter , one can then
study the homology of the inclusions ı : H•(Ci)→ H•(Cj ) for i < j. Such maps are important as
they capture topological features that persist over the parameter space.
The dimension of the homology groups as a function of the single parameter  can be plotted in
a diagram, called the barcodes diagram, see [24]. We show a simple example in Figure 1 where  is
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Figure 1: Example of the barcodes.
the radius of a ball around each vertex, and where there is a k-simplex whenever k+ 1 circles have
non-empty intersections. For small values of , we have that the number of connected components,
dimH0, is the number of vertices (0-simplices), and as  increases, more vertices get connected,
resulting in components to merge till a single connected component is obtained. For a small value
of  there are no high dimensional holes, however, at some point, before the first 2-simplex (blue
triangle) gets filled in, such 2-simplex is not filled and generates a hole that quickly disappears. At
a later value of , a large hole is formed at the time when the vertices form a single large connected
component. As the  parameter increases further at some point the “middle” hole gets filled and the
dimension of the first homology, dimH1 becomes zero again. As  further increases, tetrahedrons
appear, first with an empty volume, namely a void, that disappear. Higher dimensional holes will
likely occur, but we did not depict them. As  further increases the complex will have trivial higher
homology groups and only have a single connected component.
In this paper we will make use the persistent homology in the context of k-anonymity.
4 k-Anonymity via Persistent Homology:
Numerical Attributes
In this section, we describe the algebraic topological approach toward achieving k-anonymity. In
this section, we will restrict our attention to the case of the attributes in the quasi-identifier set QT
being all numeric/continuous variables, such as Age, Salaries, Taxes paid in a year, etc. In this
case, we can clearly represent the set QT as a |QT |-dimensional vector. We will assume that all the
vectors are elements of a real vector space.
Figure 2 shows an example of a table T with two identifiers (Name and Last Name), three quasi-
identifiers QT = {Age, Total Scholarship, Money Borrowed} and the sensitive column Current
Salary. As we show at the bottom of Figure 2, we can map the quasi-identifiers to a three-
dimensional vector space (three dimensional as |QT | = 3), where each entry in the table corresponds
to a point in R3.
In the following, we will often refer to entries of the table T as points due to the previously
described representation. Also, note that without any loss of generality, we can consider the data
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Figure 2: Example of a table where the first two columns are identifiers, the last column is the
sensitive data and the middle three are the quasi-identifiers. Each entry in the table can be mapped,
through the quasi-identifiers, to a point in the three-dimensional vector space, R3.
to take values within the hypercube M = [0, 1]|QT |, since one can always normalize the data
accordingly.
The first definition is a direct application of the Cˇech complex as summarized in Section 3. In
this paper, we use this structure to capture the k-anonymity property of the data.
Definition 4.1 (Anonymity Complex) Given a table T with N rows and a set of quasi-identifier QT ,
let us consider the N points {pi}N1 ∈ MN . We define an anonymity complex C(p) the simplicial
complex whose k-simplices are determined by (k+1) points {pi0 , pi1 , . . . , pik}k0 such that closed -ball
neighborhoods centered around these points have at least one intersection point. We call the radius 
the global generalization strategy.
We now introduce an important building block.
Definition 4.2 (Anonymity k-simplex) Given a global generalization , we say that k points
have the k-anonymity property if all the closed -ball neighborhoods of the k points all intersect in
at least a point. In this case, we have that the k points form a k-simplex, which we term as an
anonymity k-simplex and denote with Sk.
Figure 3(a) shows an example of an anonymity 4-simplex for a given global generalization  while
Figure 3(b) shows an example where for the same value of , 4-anonymity cannot be achieved.
The following is a useful test to determine whether k-anonymity can be achieved for a given
value of  or not.
6
Figure 3: In (a), we show a anonymity 4-simplex representing the fact that there exists an  such
that the 4 points can be anonymized. In (b), we show an example where there is no anonymity
4-simplex (indeed we have only two 2-simplices) as the selected  is not large enough, or equivalently
the generalization is high enough, to ensure 4-anonymity.
Lemma 4.1 Given a set of points p = {pi}N1 corresponding to N rows of the table T , given a global
generalization  and the corresponding anonymity complex C(p), we have that the points {pi}N1 have
the k-anonymity property if and only if
C(p) =
⋃
i
S`i
where S`i is the i-th anonymity `i-simplex with `i ≥ k for i ∈ N0. We say in this case that the
anonymity complex achieves k-anonymity.
Proof: The points {pi}N1 have the k-anonymity property if and only if we can sub-divide the set of
points into subsets such that
{pi}N1 = {pi}i11︸ ︷︷ ︸
Σ`1
∪{pi}i2i1+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Σ`2
∪ · · · ∪ {pi}NiN−1+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Σ`N
,
and to each subset Σ`i(p), we can associate an anonymity `i-simplex S`i with `i ≥ k for any i (for
given fixed ) and S`i ∩ S`j = ∅ for i 6= j.
Given the previous set relations, we have that complex C associated with the set of points {pi}
is then given by the union of the S`i . 
This result then establishes a natural connection between the properties of the anonymity
complex, in terms of some of its subcomplexes, and the k-anonymity property.
We further explore how topological properties of the anonymity complex are related to the k-
anonymity property and how we can leverage that to find an “optimal” generalization. Let us first
establish some topological properties of C and then define explicitly what we mean with “optimal”
generalization.
Proposition 4.1 An anonymity complex C, for a given , has the k-anonymity property if and
only if its homology groups Hn(C) are trivial for any n > 0, and every connected components is an
`-simplex with ` ≥ k. Furthermore, when this is the case the number of equivalence classes generated
by using the  generalization is given by the dimension of the zero-th homology, dimH0(C).
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Algorithm 1 k-anonymity via Persistence Homology
Inputs: p = {pi}N1 ∈ Rd×N , Parameter: k, Radii: {1, . . . , M}
Re-scale the dataset into the unit cube [0, 1]d ⊂ Rd×N .
for every value of  ∈ {1, . . . , M} do
Construct the anonymity complex C(p)
end for
Compute weighted persistent homology
return Complete bar code diagram
Proof: (If) From Lemma 4.1, we know that we can decompose C into a finite number of disjoint
anonymity k-simplices. It is known [21] that in this case Hn(C) =
⊕
iHn(S`i), namely the n-th
homology of C is given by the direct sum of the n-th homology of the anonymity k-simplices. As
the k-simplices are simply connected spaces and contractible, they have trivial high order (n > 0)
homology groups and H0(S`i) ≈ Z for every i.
(Only if) Let us assume that C has Hn(C) = {0} for n > 0, and H0(C) is non-trivial, and
in particular let us assume that H0(C) ≈ Rs. This means that the complex C has s connected
components. From the hypothesis that the connected components are `-simplices with ` ≥ k,
we know that each component is a anonymity simplex. Thus the anonymity complex C has the
k-anonymity property. 
We are now able to connect topological properties of the anonymity complex with the k-
anonymity property. Of course, as it can be seen from Proposition 4.1, the result still depends
on , namely the generalization.
When anonymizing a dataset, one is typically interested in “corrupting” the data by the least
amount. Indeed, if one carefully thinks about the k-anonymity problem, it is always possible to find
a large enough k that makes the data anonymous, i.e., if one makes the extreme choice of k = n,
then the entire data will be in one equivalence class and thus, k-anonymity will be achieved. The
issue with this is that the information contained in the data will be completely lost.
In the context of this paper, as the generalization is parametrized by , we are interested for
find the smallest value of  that gives k-anonymity. We then have the following definition.
Definition 4.3 (Minimal Anonymity Complex) Given an anonymity complex C(p) associ-
ated to a set of points, lets us denote with C the anonymity complex for a given generalization .
We define as minimal anonymity complex the following object
C
∗
= min

C ,
such that C
∗
achieves k-anonymity.
Even without minimization over , the k-anonymity problem known to be an NP-hard problem,
and so it is clear that we cannot easily find the minimal anonymity complex. To find an approximate
solution to the problem, we instead study the persistent homology of C. In particular, in this paper,
we adapt the idea of persistent homology as a tool to provide the full spectrum of k-anonymization
one can obtain. Our approach is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Note that the parameter  induces a family of complexes such that C1
ı
↪→ C2 ı↪→ · · · ı↪→ CM ,
where i ≤ j , for any i < j, and thus we recover the same setting as in the persistent homology.
Formally we have a -based filtration [24]. The idea here is to leverage the barcodes or persistent
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Age ZIP Code Salary
25 47677 $47,000
22 47602 $32,000
24 47678 $52,000
43 47905 $151,000
52 47909 $145,000
38 47906 $98,000
47 47605 $110,000
36 47673 $92,000
32 47607 $115,000
(a) Example data set with QT =
{Age,ZIP Code}.
Age ZIP Code
[22-25] [47602-47678]
[22-25] [47602-47678]
[22-25] [47602-47678]
[38-52] [47905-47909]
[38-52] [47905-47909]
[38-52] [47905-47909]
[32-47] [47605-47603]
[32-47] [47605-47603]
[32-47] [47605-47603]
(b) 3-anonymized table
Table 1: Sample data set for illustrative purpose.
diagram to extract regimes of interests, namely anonymity strategies – values of  – that lead to
k-anonymity for different values of k.
Such a persistent diagram has two specific features:
• Each bar inH0 diagram has a weight corresponding to the number of elements in the connected
components;
• Given a value k, we only consider bars that have at least k elements.
To illustrate the proposed approach, consider the sample dataset shown in part (a) of Table 1.
The quasi-identifier set QT = {Age,ZIP Code}, while the salary field is the sensitive one. Figure 4
shows an example of the output of the barcode diagram. For the case of 3-anonymity in particular,
the lower center figure depicts H0 while the one in top center shows the H1. We can see that a hole
gets created for the values of the radius approximately in [0.11, 0.13] and then it gets filled thereby
making the dataset 3-anonymous. But again in the interval [0.17, 0.19], a hole gets created around
when the complex [1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9] gets formed. After  increases more, this hole disappears and we
are left with an anonymity 3-simplex [4, 5, 6] and an anonymity 6-simplex [1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9].
We can clearly see three regimes where 3-anonymity is possible. The first one (as indicated) has
three classes with three elements in each. The second regime corresponds to the values of radius
in the interval [0.19, 0.4] which has only two equivalence classes, and the third one (radius greater
than 0.4) being the trivial solution where there is only one class with nine elements.
For minimal data quality loss, the interval [0.17, 0.19] is the best solution as 3-anonymity can
be reached with largest number of classes. Mapping the first one back to the dataset yields a
3-anonymous version of the dataset shown in part (b) of Table 1.
In Figure 4 shows that 2-anonymity can be achieved for generalizations  > 0.08. For general-
izations with  ≤ 0.08, we have only one anonymity 2-simplex and the rest of the data will be just
points, thus 2-anonymity cannot be achieved. The rightmost plot shows that 4-anonymity can be
reached for  > 0.4. Note that even if there is an anonymity 6-simplex in the interval [0.19, 0.4],
there is no way for the [4, 5, 6] complex to achieve 4-anonymity and thus the generalizations in the
interval [0.19, 0.4] will not yield 4-anonymity. For  > 0.4], we can clearly achieve 4-anonymity, but
as everything gets into a single class, all the data will be generalized to the same record and thus
data quality is compromised.
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Figure 4: Weighted barcode showing the full spectrum of anonymity regimes. Although the barcode is
only a single diagram, we split it here into three diagrams where we only show the simplices that meet the
requirements of the k-anonymity indicated underneath each figure. With red bars we show regimes that
cannot achieve 2,3,4-anonymity. These correspond to either situations where not all the k-simplices admit
trivial higher order homology groups, as is the case for 3-anonymity between [0.11, 0.13] and [0.17, 0.19], not
all the simplices are `-simplices with ` ≥ k. This happens for example in 2-anonymity in the interval [0, 0.08]
and between [0.19, 0.4] for 4-anonymity. We only show here dimH0 and dimH1 as higher order homology
groups are trivial for this simple example.
Remark 4.1 (Advantages of proposed approach) The main advantage of the method pro-
posed is that it enables us not only to find a k-anonymization for a fixed k (if it exists), but also
to provide alternative regimes that can be especially useful when k-anonymity cannot be achieved
for the given k. This generally is not something that other algorithms, such as [5, 7, 8] directly
provide. Indeed, one would need to run the same algorithms for various values of k to obtain the
same tradeoff picture as we obtain. The persistent diagram we consider in this paper is instead
computed in one shot from the filtration {C}. Furthermore, we leverage very scalable algorithms
for such computation based on discrete Morse theory, see [25, 22]. Also, note that not only the
persistent diagram allows us to determine the right regime that gives the desired k-anonymity, but
we can also look at the other important tradeoff parameter such as the number of classes. For a
given k, it is indeed possible to find various generalizations  that meet the k-anonymity require-
ment, however some might lead to equivalence classes with many more than k elements that is in
general not desirable.
5 Zig-Zag Persistent Homology for Mixed Data
The methodology we have described in the previous section has clearly nice properties but has
some limitations. First, it is restricted to numerical attributes where the notion of a radius is well
10
(a) Example of generalization for two set of labels. On the top for countries
and on the bottom for gender.
(b) Generalization lattice for the at-
tributes countries and gender.
Figure 5: In (a) we show two generalization trees and in (b) we show the corresponding general-
ization lattice.
defined and thus it would not work in the case where attributes are categorical in nature, such
as, for example, strings, labels, social security numbers, etc. Second, growing balls (or polytopic
approximations) in high dimensional spaces and determining intersections can be computationally
challenging. In this section, we discuss an extension that leads to weighted persistent diagrams as
the one described in the previous section and that can be used to explore anonymity tradeoffs.
For anonymization of categorical data, one needs to specify generalization trees that enforce
a certain partial order between the various generalizations. Let us consider a simple example
where there are two attributes: Countries and Gender. Examples of generalization tree are shown
in Figure 5a where, as one moves from leaves to the root, the generalization becomes increas-
ingly coarser, see for example [5]. We thus have that {Portugal, Spain} ≺ {WestEurope} and
{WestEurope,EastEurope} ≺ {Europe}, etc. or where {Male, Female} ≺ {Person}. We may
capture the generalization of numerical values within trees as well.
Formally, we have that a generalization tree is a map T : N × [0, r] → A where N is the
set all nodes in the trees (including root and leaves) and [0, r] is the level of the generalization.
For example, T ({USA,Canada}, 2) = America. For this setting, we can extend the notion of
anonymity complex as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Generalized Anonymity Complex) Given a table T with N rows and a set
of quasi-identifiers QT as well as a set of generalization trees Tk for k = 1, . . . , |QT |, we define the
generalization anonymity complex Γ as the simplicial complex whose k-simplices are determined by
(k + 1) |QT |-dimensional tuples {Ai}ki=1 such that there exists a r¯ such that Ti(Ai, r¯) = Tj(Aj , r¯).
The definition of a generalized anonymity k-simplex can be obtained as well. For example,
{Portugal, Spain,Hungary} forms a generalized anonymity 3-simplex for the generalization level
2, considering the tree in Figure 5a.
Definition 5.2 (Generalization lattice) Given a |QT |-dimensional tuple representing attributes
and the associated trees Tk for each attribute, we can construct a directed graph (lattice) where the
11
vertices are the tuples
< T1(A1, s), T2(A2, s2), . . . , T|QT |(γ|QT |, s|QT |) >
and there is an edge between two vertices if there exists a generalization si + 1 for an attribute Ai.
Figure 5b shows an example of a generalization lattice for the attributes {Country,Gender}.
Given the generalization trees and the previous definitions, we can see the similarity with the
previous section, where we were interested in searching for regimes where the anonymity complexes
have trivial high-order homology groups. The critical difference is, however, that these generaliza-
tions are not dependent on a single parameter ( in the previous section) anymore and thus we do
not have a filtration in general.
In fact, the anonymity complexes, for various degrees of generalization, satisfy the following
commutative diagram1: which is clearly not a filtration, but rather a multi-dimensional filtration.
C10 C11 C12 C13
C00 C01 C02 C03
ı ı ı
ı
ı
ı
ı
ı
ı ı (1)
Unfortunately, computation of the barcodes assoiated to a multi-dimensional persistent homology
is still an open question, although progress has been made in recent years, see [26] and references
therein.
There are two ways we can tackle this problem, using either some further assumptions on the
generalization or an approximation. The first is via zig-zag persistent homology [27]. In this context,
we need to assume an ordering of the generalizations, something that is not uncommon, see [8].
Given the structure of the problem, a reasonable sequence of spaces to be considered would be
C00, C01, C02, C03, C10, C11, C12, C13 leading to the following commutative diagram:
C00
ı
↪→ C01 ı↪→ C02 ı↪→ C03︸ ︷︷ ︸
C00−3
↔ C10 ı↪→ C11 ı↪→ C12 ı↪→ C13︸ ︷︷ ︸
C10−3
.
Note that the middle map is not an inclusion. It is possible to still compute persistent homology
of the full chain by “joining” the two subsequences of spaces C00−3 and C10−3 through their
union as follows: In this case, by using Mayer-Vietoris pyramid principle [27], we can compute the
C03 ∪ C10
C00−3 C10−3
ıı
persistent homology of the chain and by passing through the union we obtain the barcodes for the
initial chain [27]. Given the barcodes we are now in the same situation as in the previous section
where we can search for different k-anonymity regimes.
Note however that the previous barcode would be different than the one built for the following
sequence, say C00, C10, C01, C11, C02, C12, C03, C13. In this case we would need to apply Mayer-
Veitoris pyramid principle multiple times:
1We denote with C00 the generalized anonymity complex corresponding to the generalization < G0, C0 >, as in
Figure 5b
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C10 ∪ C01
C00 C10 C01 C11
C11 ∪ C02
C13 C03 C12 C02
C03 ∪ C12
ı
ı
ı
ı
ı
ı
ı
ı
ı
ı
An alternative approach to compute the barcodes for (1), is via an approximation. Specifically,
one can consider the persistence equivalence theorem [28, Section 2.4.2] where, given the commu-
tative diagram in (1), one can compute the persistent homology for the lower and upper chains.
Because of the inclusion maps we have that the persistent homology modules of the two chains
respect the inclusions. We can then proceed as follows: we first compute the persistent homology
of the lower chain in the commutative diagram (1) and if it achieves the desired k-anonymity, then,
because of the inclusion maps, such k-anonymity can be achieved also by the upper chain in (1),
thus we do not need to compute the barcodes for the upper chain and stop after obtaining the
barcodes for the lower one.
However, if k-anonymity is not achieved considering the lower chain, then persistent homol-
ogy and corresponding barcodes need to be computed for the upper chain. Note that as we are
approximating a multi-dimensional persistent homology by a sequence of (independent) persis-
tent homology computation, if k-anonymity cannot be achieved following such process we cannot
conclude that there is not a way to k-anonymize the data. This is a consequence of the natural
complexity of the anonymity problem.
6 Conclusion
This paper introduced a new perspective to k-anonymity in data privacy based on algebraic topol-
ogy. In particular, we addressed the case when the data lies in a metric space. We demonstrated
how tools such as persistence homology can be applied to efficiently obtain the entire spectrum of
k-anonymity of the database for various values of the radius of proximity. For this representation,
we provided an analytic characterization of conditions under which a given representation of the
dataset is k-anonymous. Finally, we discussed how this method can be extended to address the
general case of a mix of categorical and metric data.
In future, it would be interesting to investigate other notions of privacy using these tools. In
particular, applicability of such techniques to dynamic databases would be an interesting case which
naturally arise in control applications.
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